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Multi-Country
The Regulation of Commercial Profiling - A Comparative Analysis
Indra Spiecker genannt Dchmann and Olivia Tambou, Paul Bernal, MargaretHu, Carlos
Alberto Molinaro,Elsa Negre, Ingo Wolfgang Sarlet,Laura Schertel Mendes, Nornann
Witzleb and FlorianYger*

The authors, all data protection experts, discuss the
status of the relevant data protection regulatory
framework on profiling in the business sector in sev
eral countries worldwide, from the constitutional lev
el to some individual regulation including the gener
al attitude towards the topic. The EU perspective is
presented on the basis of the present directives as
well as the General Data Protection Regulation. The
United Kingdom, Germany and France, as three of
the largest EU Member States with partly highly dif
fering regulatory approaches represent Member
State law. Australia, Brazil and the US regulation ex
emplify the different integration of data protection
standards and different models of approaching pro
filing in the globalised IT world.**

I. Introduction
In surveys, citizens regularly express significant con
cern about the gathering of profiling information for

Indra Spiecker genannt Ddhmann, LL.M. (Georgetown), holds
the Chair in Public and Administrative Law, Information Law,
Environmental Law and Legal Theory at Goethe-University
Frankfurt a.M., Germany; Olivia Tambou is Associate Professor
at the Universit6 Paris-Dauphine, PSL Research University,
Cr2D, France; Paul Bernal is Lecturer in Information Technology,
Intellectual Property and Media Law at the University of East
Anglia Law School, Great Britain; Margaret Hu serves as Associate Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of
Law, USA; Carlos Alberto Molinaro is Professor at Pontifical
Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS), Brazil;
Elsa Negre is Assistant Professor in Computer Sciences at Universite Paris-Dauphine, PSL Research University, CNRS UMR 7243,
LAMSADE, Data Science TeamFrance; Ingo Wolfgang Sarlet is
Professor at Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul
(PUCRS), Brazil; Laura Schertel Mendes serves as Professor at
the University of Brasilia (UnB) and at the Institute for Public
Law of Brasilia (IDP), Brazil; Normann Witzleb is Associate
Professor and Deputy Director of the Centre for Commercial
Law and Regulatory Studies at the Faculty of Law, Monash
University, Australia; Florian Yger is Assistant Professor in Computer Sciences at Universit6 Paris-Dauphine, PSL Research
University, CNRS UMR 7243, LAMSADE, Data Science Team,

commercial and other purposes.1 This fear of becom
ing a transparent citizen, of being controlled and po
tentially manipulated by the state or by companies
with superior information, has been a prominent rea
son for data protection from its very beginnings. 2 In
formation service providers, on the other hand, have
long searched for measures to learn more about the
behaviour, preferences and decisions of their clients,
customers (and potential clients and customers) and
citizens on the basis of collective and group informa
tion, in order to create contracts and relationships
based on more precise predictions and individual
evaluations of risk. The rise of high velocity, high vol
ume and high variety data processing, often referred
to as 'Big' or 'Smart' Data, has made these analyses
not only more likely, but also more accessible. As a
result, profiling has become an every day measure in
evaluating counterparts, both by the state and by pri
vate companies.
The conflict between the interests of the individ
ual in preserving their privacy and restricting access

France.
We would like to thank the Universit6 Paris-Dauphine for their
support to a workshop in June 2016 in which this paper and
project were developed. Olivia Tambou also thanks Alexandre
Lercher for his contributions on the French law; Indra Spiecker
thanks Dirk Muellmann for his contributions on the German law.
This report is part of an ongoing larger project comparing the
legal status of profiling initiated by Olivia Tambou. If you are
interested in our working group, please contact Olivia Tambou
(<olivia.tambou@dauphine.fr>) or Indra Spiecker (<spiecker@jur
.uni-frankfurt.de>).
See eg European Commission, Data Protection Report (Special
Eurobarometer 431, 2015) 39 <http://ec.europa.eu/public
_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_431 en.pdf> accessed 11 November
2016; or Office of the Australian Information Commissioner,
Community Attitudes to Privacy survey (Research report, 2013)
17 et seq <https://www.oaic.gov.au/images/documents/privacy/
privacy-resources/privacy-reports/2013-community-attitudes-to
-privacy-survey-report.pdf> accessed 11 November 2016.
2

Gloria Gonzalez Fuster, The Emergence of Personal Data Protection as a Fundamental Right of the EU (Springer 2014) 55.
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to and use of their personal information and the in
terests of companies and states to know more about
their customers and citizens in order to provide
more targeted and efficient services call for balanced
regulation. However, explicit regulation of profiling
does not at present exist within consumer protec
tion law, privacy law or data protection law. And
even the new EU General Data Protection Regula
tion (GDPR), which aims to modernise and standard
ise the data protection framework across the EU
from 2o18, contains only limited regulation on pro
filing.
Profiling can be described as the process of gath
ering information and personal data, combining
this individualised data with other (eg, personal,
factual, statistical) data and analysing it through al
gorithms with the aim of predicting a person's fu
ture conditions, decisions or behaviour.3 These dif
ferent steps do not all necessarily fall under the
scope of data protection laws, as not all of them al
ways process personal data. This is true especially
for the intermediate steps of combining or reassem
bling of data, where the personal data is often
merged into grouped information about large num
bers of individuals and statistical content. It would
therefore be desirable to have a regulation that ad
dresses all relevant steps in profiling. As this, how
ever, is not the case, this article, based on informed
computer science input about the technical possi
bilities and restrictions, aims to identify the legal
status quo. We focus on profiling laws of general
application; we do not analyse sector specific reg
ulation such as in banking or credit rating. 4 As pro
filing uses information available worldwide and
produces results that are of interest everywhere in
a globalised world, a national approach or even an
EU wide approach would in general not seem to be
sufficient. We have therefore adopted a compara
tive approach that includes reports from promi
nent EU Member States (Germany, Franceand the
UK5 ) as well as the US, Brazil and Australia.As most
Asian countries, in particular China and India, have
little regulation and even less enforcement on da
ta protection to date, 6 a comparative view at this
point would not be fruitful. We also exclude the
use of profiling by state authorities and non commercial entities such as political parties. They fol
low to a great extent, the individual public and ad
ministrative legal framework of each individual
state.
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The paper will first describe how profiling oper
ates and what computer scientists view as the mech
anisms and restrictions of profiling (II.). It will then
continue with the relevant European framework
(III.), concentrating on the expected normative stan
dards of the GDPR. As we will show, the GDPR does
not provide for strict guidelines on profiling. Thus,
the present interpretations and standards in the EU
Member States will be of continuing importance, as
they present the starting point also for future EU
practice, eg, in the consistency mechanism which re
quires Member States' data protection authorities to
cooperate in order to reach a common decision. We
will then look at how the various legal issues raised
by profiling are dealt with by the jurisdictions under
consideration (IV). The paper concludes with a look
at future prospects (V).

II. What Is Profiling?
In this section, we explain the concept of profiling
as understood by computer science. This overview
will consider the data acquisition and analysis
processes, and also describe techniques to limit the
effects of profiling.

1.

Data Acquisition

The data acquisition chain is the set of elements nec
essary to 'capture' data from its creation (by a user
or a machine) to its storage for immediate or future
use. We focus on the acquisition of data through user
profiles (which can contain a large amount of user
information including preferences), cookies (which
store user navigation data) and traces (which record
activity and user identity).

3

A closer technical description of profiling follows infra II.

4

The specific regulation of profiling in the banking sector and by
credit agencies will need to be looked at separately. A major
concern here is the use of data from one sector for other purposes
than the original one.

5

As neither the form nor the full consequences of Brexit are not
currently clear, it must be noted that the UK may sooner or
later deviate from EU law, and in particular the EU data protection regime.

6

In the case of India, much data processing involving European
citizens is performed on the basis of standard contract clauses
assuring European level of data protection.
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a. User Profile and Preferences

b. Cookies

A user profile is a set of personal data associated with
a specific user or a customised desktop environment.
A profile 7 therefore refers to the digital representa
tion of a person's identity. Profiles can be construct
ed through explicit or implicit data collection. Data
collection is explicit when the user explicitly provides
personal information, for example, classifies a collec
tion of items according to his/her preferences or cre
ates a list of interesting features. In contrast, data col
lection is implicit 8 when preferences/opinions of the
user are induced from the actions of the user, ie what
elements were viewed, or by keeping track of the
user's navigation (purchases; items where the user
has lingered, etc). Note that users tend to have little
patience and/or willingness to give information
about their preferences, so that the systems have a
very incomplete picture of the users' preferences. In
order to gain more information, additional user pref
erences are inferred 9 from the induced/elicited or ob
10
served preferences, based on assumptions. 11

A cookie 1 2 is a small text file that is downloaded to

7

Riddhiman Ghosh and Mohamed E Dekhil, 'Discovering user
profiles' (ACM Digital Library, Proceedings of the 18th international conference on World wide web (WWW '09), Madrid,
Spain, 20-24 April 2009) 1233-1234.

8

Alan Mislove et al, 'You are who you know: inferring user profiles
in online social networks' (ACM Digital Library, Proceedings of
the Third ACM International Conference on Web Search and
Data Mining (WSDM '10), New York, USA, 3-6 February 2010)
251-260.

9

Dianne Kelly and Jaime Teevan, 'Implicit Feedback for Inferring
User Preference: A Bibliography', SIGIR Forum 37, 2 (2003) 18 et
seq.

10

Nic Wilson, Anne-Marie George, and Barry O'Sullivan, 'Computation and Complexity of Preference Inference Based on Hierarchical Models' in Qiang Yang and Michael Wooldridge (eds),
Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (IJCA'I 5) (AAA[ Press 2015) 3271 et seq.

11

Vincent Schickel-Zuber and Boi Faltings, 'Inferring user's preferences using ontologies' in Anthony Cohn (ed), Proceedings of the
21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
(AAAI'06) (AAA[ Press 2006) 1413-1418.

12

David Kristol, 'HTTP Cookies: Standards, privacy, and politics'
(November 2001) 1(2) ACM Transactions on Internet Technology
151-198.

13

Eg in France, a cookie has a maximum lifespan of 13 months, see
<http://www.cnil.fr/fr/cookies-traceurs-que-dit-la-loi> accessed 11
November 2016

14

Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 25 November 2009 amending Directive 2002/22/EC
on universal service and users' rights relating to electronic communications networks and services, Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of
privacy in the electronic communications sector and Regulation
(EC) No 2006/2004 on cooperation between national authorities
responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws
[2009] OJ L 337/11.

a user's device and saved in the web browser when
users access a particular website. Cookies allow the
storage of user data (such as IP addresses, passwords,
items in an online shopping cart) or users' browsing

activity (including clicking particular buttons, log
ging in) in order to facilitate navigation and enable
some features. Most modern browsers allow users to
decide whether to accept or reject cookies. Users can
usually also determine the cookie's expiry. 13 While
cookies improve the convenience of web browsing,
they have always been controversial because they
store information that can potentially be exploited
by third parties. This is one of the reasons why the
EU regulated the use of cookies in the so called 'Cook
ies Directive.

14

c. Traces
Like a trace left in the snow, a user leaves a certain
number of clues in form of data recorded by the serv
er hosting the visited website. Among them are traces
related to the computer such as the IP address, the
environment variable (information about the operat
ing system running on the computer, usually useful
to adapt the display of a website) and traces related
to past searches of a user (on a web search engine).
The latter traces can reveal user interests (keywords
used), visited websites (links chosen within search
results), location (via the IP address) and dates of ac
cess. A trace can be used for analysing a user's behav
iour (eg, in order to enhance the quality of web nav
igation on the website or in order to display relevant
advertisement).

d. Metadata/Data
Contextual information on collected data is called
metadata. Metadata can be thought of as data about
data, eg the metadata of an email would consist of
the sender, the recipient, the timestamp, the IP ad
dresses etc. By its nature, metadata is often less di
rectly protected (for example, it is created by default
by most softwares for text and images) and it can of
ten be easier to collect than the data itself. Metadata
are simple but structured data, and lots of informa
tion can be deduced from it, eg the width, quality and
intensity of someone's personal network could be re

538
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constructed from the email's metadata. In practice,
the metadata can be a rough summary of the data it
self and it is difficult to make a clear distinction be
tween data and metadata as the metadata can be de
duced from the data.
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situations. The difference between the two fields is
not always simple. In general, however, data mining
mainly focuses on the analysis and exploration while
machine learning focuses on decision making.

b. Recommendations

2. Data Analysis/Mining
Data analysis is a process of preprocessing (cleaning
and transforming) data and applying relevant mod
els to them in order to automatically discover useful
information and to support decision making. The fol
lowing items describe different aspects of informa
tion selection and evaluation processes that are used
in profiling.

a. Data Mining/Machine Learning
Data mining and machine learning are two interdis
ciplinary subfields of Artificial Intelligence (AI) at
the crossing of several other domains (statistics, ap
plied mathematics and computer science). Those two
subfields consist of expressing the data in a mathe
matical framework. They use a particular vocabulary:
data will be referred to as population or individuals.
A population is the set of individuals a study is inter
ested in. Every individual is described by the same
set of characteristics (known as variables or features).
Relationships between individuals, between vari
ables or between individuals and variables are sought
in order to model behaviour. The philosophy is to in
volve the human as little as possible in the creation
of a predictive model. Thus, the more data are gath
ered, the better the algorithms will perform (hence
the term 'Big Data'). However, if an algorithm is fed
with bad, unreliable, noisy or corrupted data, its pre
diction will be bad as well.
Data mining consists of discovering and extract
ing non trivial patterns and behaviour in large
datasets (such as traces). Those discovered patterns
are then used as a means of analysis and sometimes
for prediction of behaviour and decisions. Machine
learning is often described as the field giving to computers the ability to learn without being explicitly
programmed. The computer is trained to recognise
some behaviour from examples (positives or nega
tives). It then acquires this ability to understand be
haviour or complex situations without having been
explicitly programmed with a description of those

Users face ever increasing quantities of information,
due to increased calculation and storage capacity, 15
which makes it increasingly difficult to know exact
ly what information to look for and where. Recom
mender systems 16 guide users in their exploration of
data by a specific form of information filtering, in or
der to obtain relevant information. Generally, based
on certain reference characteristics, 17 the recommen
dation process aims to predict the 'opinion' a user
will have of each item and to recommend items with
the best predicted 'opinion'.

3. Technologies Invoked to Limit Profiling
The following techniques describe ways how to limit profiling.
a. Data Minimisation
In the context of profiling, data minimisation means
extracting only what is relevant to the task to be
solved. The goal must be clearly defined beforehand
to help decide the life span of the collected data. Such
an approach contradicts the usual approach in ma
chine learning and data mining where in principle
more data results in better algorithmic predictions.
In practice, a trade off has to be found to reduce the
quantity whilst gathering the relevant data.1 8 In
terms of privacy, storing less data can be good for the
individuals. For companies, there is may be also a tip

15

A study of the UCLA Berkeley estimates the quantity of information newly created each year at approximately two exabytes per
year (1 exabyte - 10

8

bytes) <http://www2.sims.berkeley.edu/

research/projects/how-much-info-2003/> accessed 11 November
2016.
16

Elsa Negre, Information and Recommender Systems (Wiley 2016)
7.

17

These characteristics may come eg from the information items
themselves (a content-based approach) or the social environment
(collaborative filtering) and are based on the user profile, some
contextual parameters, the knowledge model, etc.

18

Katrin Borcea-Pfitzmann, Andreas Pfitzmann and Manuela Berg,
'Privacy 3.0 :- Data Minimization + User Control + Contextual
Integrity' (2011) 53(1) Information Technology 34-40.
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ping point where even though more data is accumu
lated, the algorithms will behave the same, and the
profit, generated by using those algorithms, will stay
the same while the cost of storing data would rise.
b. Encryption
In cryptography, encryption consists in altering the
content of a document to prevent its being under
stood by anyone without the 'key' to the encryption.
This 'key' must be communicated between the par
ties exchanging the document.
Classically, encrypting a document is depicted as
putting a lock on a trunk. Knowledge of how a lock
operates is not enough to open it without the key.
Similarly, knowing the algorithm used for encrypt
ing a document is not enough to access its content
without this key. Just as in practice there are many
ways to force a lock or to pick it, there are ways to
break encryption.
Encryption is a basic tool for protecting data and
preventing access to (and diffusion of) it, which is
even more important when a database contains sen
sitive or personal data that was not anonymised. The
access to such a database would make the profiling
of any particular user whose data are stored in that
database an easy task. 9
c. Anonymisation/Pseudonymisation

Reports 1 539

possible) to identify a particular individual. As op
posed to encryption, where the sender and the receiv
er are supposed to be able to read the message, it is
designed to prevent the interpretation of the data by
anyone and it is intended not to be reversible.
Anonymisation of a dataset is a complex task as the
data has to be modified in order to make a given user
unidentifiable but without significantly reducing the
overall quality of the data. Furthermore, anonymisa
tion should not add too much 'noise' or any harmful
artefact to the data. 2021
Pseudonymisation can be viewed as a special case
of anonymisation where only the most sensitive parts
of the data are replaced by aliases, typically names
or addresses. Anonymisation and pseudonymisation
ensure that the profile of any given user cannot be
recognised.22

d. Differential Privacy
Differential privacy lies at the interface between ma
chine learning, anonymisation and cryptography
and proposes to modify the data (or its structure) in
order to maximise the accuracy of queries from sta
tistical databases and at the same time to minimise
the chances of identifying its records. In other words,
it is a machine learning efficient anonymisation.
Hence, it prevents the access to any particular user's
profile while ensuring that relevant statistics can be
23
computed on the data.

Anonymisation consists of modifying the data con
tent (or structure) to make it very difficult (if not im

III. The European Approach to Profiling
19 Murat Ak et al, 'Efficient broadcast encryption with user profiles'
(2010) 180(6) Information Sciences 1060-1072.
20 Marcus Sch6ller, Thomas Garner and Christoph P Mayer, 'PktAnon A Generic Framework for Profile-based Traffic
Anonymization' (2008) 31(2) Praxis der lnformationsverarbeitung
und Kommunikation 76-81.
21

UK [CO, Anonymisation: managing data protection risk code of
practice (2012) <https://ico.org.uk/media/1061 /anonymisation
-code.pdf> accessed 11 November 2016.

22

Slaughter and May, 'Personal data, anonymisation and pseudo-

nymisation under the GDPR' (Ouly 2016) <https://www

.slaughterandmay.com/media/253 5637/personal -data
-anonym isation-and-pseudonymisation-under-the-gdpr.pdf> accessed 11 November 2016.
23

Cynthia Dwork and Aaron Roth, 'The Algorithmic Foundations of
Differential Privacy' (2014) 9(3-4) Theoretical Computer Science
211-407.

24 Council of Europe, The protection of individuals with regard to
automatic processing of personal data in the context of profiling,
Recommendation CM/Rec (2010)13, 2010.
25

Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2016] OJ
C202/389.

1. Council of Europe Recommendations
on Profiling and EU Regulatory
Framework
The Council of Europe adopted a set of principles
for all forms of personal data processing using pro
filing techniques in 2010, and recommended to
Member States that they should be implemented
into domestic law.24 These recommendations do
not form part of the EU regulatory framework on
profiling, which consists of regulation on three lev
els:
* Article 7 (respect for private and family life) and
Article 8 (protection of personal data) of the Char
ter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union,2 5 together with Article 16 of the Treaty on

540
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26

the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),
provide the constitutional framework for the pro
tection of personal data.27 Additionally, Article 8
of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) 28 also protects the right to respect for one's
private and family life.
On the EU secondary law level, profiling falls
presently under the Data Protection Directive
(DPD). 29 The so called 'E privacy Directive' 30 and
the Cookie Directive, currently under review, also
contain relevant regulation specifying eg the lev
el of consent and the formal requirements for a
telecommunication based consent.
On a third level, non binding sources such as rec
ommendations or opinions, in particular those
adopted by the Article 29 Working Party, influence
the legal regime covering profiling. This European
data protection framework has given Member
States ample room to develop their own defini
tions, rules and interpretations on profiling.
This, however, will change when the new General Da
ta Protection Regulation (GDPR) 31 will come into ef
fect in May 2018. The GDPR will be directly applica
ble to individuals in all Member States with only a
limited number of opening clauses leaving Member
States a leeway for own regulation. 32 The following
sections will give an overview over the changes in
law relevant for profiling.

evaluation. It includes the automatic processing of
personal data only, and therefore does not include
the collection and the analysis of anonymous data
for the creation of profiles, one of the major steps of
profiling. The processing of personal data often ap
pears at the last stage of the inference, when the
group profile is applied to an individual person. How
ever, this aspect may be covered by the rules govern
ing automated decisions. Also, the very general def
inition covers several procedures that were previous
ly treated separately in the Member States, eg scor
ing.

3. Ban on Decisions Solely Based on
Automated Processing: Article 22
GDPR
In Article 15, the DPD provided that individuals
should not be subject to a decision based solely on
automated processing of data where this decision
produces legal effects or similarly significantly af
fects the data subject. The GDPR retains this princi

26 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Consolidated
version 2016) [2016] OJ C 202/47.
27

2. Definition of Profiling in the GDPR
While the DPD is silent on profiling, leaving its def
inition and regulation largely to the Member States,
the GDPR expressly refers to profiling 23 times.33 Ar
ticle 4 includes the first definition of profiling in EU
Law, which will now be directly and identically ap
plicable in the 28 EU Member States:
Profiling means any form of automated process
ing of personal data consisting of the use of per
sonal data to evaluate certain personal aspects re
lating to a natural person, in particular to analyse
or predict aspects concerning that natural person's
performance at work, economic situation, health,
personal preferences, interests, reliability, behav
iour, location or movements.
Importantly, this definition refers to automatic pro
cessing of personal information for the purposes of

412016

The CJEU so far has not distinguished between these two provisions,
see eg Cases C-92, 93/09 Schecke, v Land Hessen, Eifert v Land
Hessen [CJEU, 2010] ECR 2010 [-11063 para 52; Cases C-468,
469/10 ASNEF v Administracion del Estado, FECEMD v Administraci6n del Estado [CJEU, 2011] ECR 2011 [-12181, paras. 40 et
seqq; Case C-291/12 Schwarz v Stadt Bochum [CJEU, 2013]
ECLI:EU:C:2013:670, para 53; Cases C-293/1, C-594/12 Digital
Rights Ireland Ltd. v Minister for Communications, Marine and
Natural resources and others, Kamtener Landesregierung and
others [CJEU, 2014] ECKL:EU:C:2014:238 paras 24, 29 et seq; Case
C-131/12 Google Spain vAEPD [CJEU, 2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:317
para 74; Case C-362/14 Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner
[CJEU, 2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, paras 39, 66.

28 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, 213 UNTS 221.
29 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard
to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of
such data [1995] OJ L281/31.
30 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal
data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector [2002] OJ L201/37.
31

Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC [2016]
OJ L119/1.

32

See eg Alexander Benecke and Julian Wagner, 'National Legislation within the Framework of the GDPR' (2016) 3 EDPL 353-361.

33

In eight recitals (24, 60, 63, 70, 71, 72, 73, 91) and nine articles
(4, 13, 14, 15, 21, 22, 35, 47, 70).
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ple in Article 22, referring in the heading to profil
ing as being one such form of processing. Recital 71
gives two illustrations, namely 'an automatic refusal
of an online credit application or e recruiting prac
tices without any human intervention'.
While Article 22 GDPR generally prohibits auto
mated decision making on the basis of profiling, this
prohibition is subject to three wide exceptions. These
exceptions include that the data subject has explicit
ly consented [Article 22(2)(c)], or that automated de
cision making is 'necessary for entering into, or per
formance of a contract' [Article 22(2)(a)].3 4 When one
of these exceptions applies, the data controller shall
establish suitable measures to safeguard the data sub
ject's rights, freedoms and interests, including 'the
right to obtain human intervention on the part of the
controller, to express her or his point of view and to
contest the decision' [Article 22(3)]. This does, how
ever, not mean that any human intervention will nec
essarily result in an outcome that deviates from the
decision proposed by the algorithm. Article 22(2)(b)
also contains an opening clause under which the
Member States can create further exceptions subject
to suitable protections. 35 So, the individual is grant
ed the possibility to protest against the phenomenon
of the 'algorithmic governability' 36 . This right could
help the detection of automated decision making
based on false profiles, but does not restrict the use
of profiles as such. This can be derived in connection
with the accountability principle and the new oblig
ations for data controllers to conduct prior data pro
tection impact assessments (Article 35) as well as for
companies or public authorities whose core activities
rely on profiling to have a Data Protection Officer
(Article 37).

34 While the Regulation itself does not define the scope of 'necessary', recital 72 expresses the expectation that the European
Data Protection Board will issue guidance on profiling. The use of
special categories of data (ie sensitive data) is subject to further
restrictions. Recital 71 also notes that profiling should not concern children.
35

Recital 71 envisages authorisations by Member States for the
purposes of fraud and tax-evasion monitoring and prevention.

36 Antoinette Rouvroy and Bernard Stiegler, Le regime de verite
numerique, Socio, 4/2015, 113-140; Jan Philipp Albrecht and
Florian Jotzo, Das neue Datenschutzrecht der EU (Nomos 2017)
ch 3, paras 61, 64; Ulrich Dammann, 'Erfolge und Defizite der
EU-Datenschutzgrundverordnung' [2016] ZD 307, 312 et seqq;
Carolin Hohmann, 'Rechte der betroffenen Person' in Alexander
Rognagel (ed), 'Europaische Datenschutzgrundverordnung: Vorrang der Unionsrechts - Anwendbarkeit des nationalen Rechts'
(Nomos 2017), ch 3 IV, 147.
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4. General Data Processing Principles
Outside the scope of Article 22 GDPR, most other reg
ulatory requirements regarding profiling are derived
from general principles regarding data processing
(Article 5) and provisions regulating the lawfulness
of data processing (Article 6). Profiling is permitted
if either the data subject has consented or the data
processing is necessary for one of the named purpos
es in Article 6, typically because the processing is nec
essary for the performance of a contract or in order
to take steps at the request of the data subject prior
to entering into a contract [Article 6(i)(b)] or because
processing is necessary for the purposes of the legit
imate interests pursued by the controller or a third
party,provided these interests outweigh the data sub
ject's rights and interests [Article 6(1)(f)].

5. Further Requirements for Profiling,
Especially Impact Assessment
Further requirements stem from the obligation of
transparency and the data subject's information and
access rights (Articles 13 15). Article 21(1) creates a
right to object to data processing including profiling
where this processing is based on Article 6(i)(e) or
(f), which then requires the controller to 'demon
strate compelling legitimate grounds for the process

ing'.
The GDPR provides for a new regulatory tool, the
'data protection impact assessment', Article 3 5 ff Such an impact assessment is generally required
where a 'systematic and extensive evaluation of per
sonal aspects relating to natural persons which is

based on automated processing, including profil
ing', is applied [Article 35(3)(a)]. If the assessment
indicates that processing would carry a high risk for
the fundamental rights of the data subject, the con
troller must establish measures to mitigate the risk
and consult with the supervisory authority (Article
36). If necessary, decisions of the Data Protection
Authority (DPA) will be taken within the newly es
tablished consistency mechanism, Article 63 et se
qq, assuring an identical interpretation and identi
cal measures taken in the Member States. This will
not necessarily lead to stricter rules on profiling, but
at least to a greater public availability of processing
measures taken and potentially to further public at
tention.
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IV. A Comparative View on Profiling

1. General Data Protection Legislation
Within the EU, the DPD continues to apply until 25
May 2018 (at which date it will be replaced by the
GDPR). The DPD does not regulate profiling explic
itly and is, in any event, subject to transposition in
to the law of Member States. Additionally, the rules
laid down in the E Privacy Directive (as amended by
the Cookies Directive) apply.
The German Constitutional Court has derived a
right to informational self determination from Arti
cle 1(i), protecting human dignity, and Article 2(1),
protecting personal autonomy, of the Basic Law, the
German constitution. The Federal Data Protection
Act (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz,BDSG) and the States'
Data Protection Acts provide the general legal frame
work transposing the DPD. In regard to profiling, the
Tele Media Act (Telemediengesetz, TMG) also ap
plies, establishing special requirements and privi
leges in regard to telemedia services, ie Internet
based information services other than telecommuni
cation services. The relevant TMG provisions imple
ment the E Privacy Directive as well as the Cookies
Directive.
The French constitution does not contain an ex
plicit guarantee for privacy, 7 or data protection. The
primary data protection statute is the Act n 78 17 of
6 January 1978 on Information technology, data files
and civil liberties (1978 Act). It has been modified
once by Act n 2004 8ol (LCEN) which transposed
the DPD, and recently in October 2016 by the Digital
Republic Law 38 . The 1978 Act is quoted in more than
130 laws. Some specific legislation, such as Article L.
34 1 and L 34 - 1 of the Postal and Electronic Com
munications Code, stems from the E Privacy and Da
ta Retention directives.
The United Kingdom has no specifically written
constitution. Privacy is protected primarily through
the Human Rights Act 1998, which makes the rights
in the ECHR enforceable under UK law, including Ar
ticle 8. The DPD was transposed into UK law through
the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA 1998). The E Pri
vacy Directive, and subsequently the Cookies Direc
tive, have also been incorporated into UK law
through the Privacy and Electronic Communications
(EC Directive) Regulations 2003 (PECR) and the Pri
vacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive)
(Amendment) Regulations 2011 respectively.
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In the United States, privacy rights protecting
against governmental actions are provided for at the
constitutional level, eg, in the First Amendment's
right to anonymous speech; and, in the criminal law
context, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments: the
Fourth Amendment's protection against unreason
able searches and seizures which may include a rea
sonable expectation of privacy analysis, or the Fifth
Amendment's right to remain silent. Also, the
Supreme Court has suggested that informational pri
vacy rights may fall within the substantive due
process protections of the US Constitution for gov
39
ernmental infringements.
Data privacy laws can be enacted at the federal or
at the state level. There are multiple federal statuto
ry provisions protecting personal data that may also
apply to profiling. Medical and health data are pro
tected under laws such as the Health Insurance Porta
bility and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and the Genet
ic Information Non discrimination Act. Financial
and commercial data are protected under statutes
such as the Fair Credit Reporting Act and statutes
criminalising identity theft.
As a consumer protection matter, data privacy
matters have increasingly fallen within the jurisdic
tion of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). For ex
ample, section 5(a) of the FTC Act provides that 'un
fair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting com
merce ... are ... declared unlawful'. The US Safe Web
Act amended the definition in section 5(a) of 'unfair
or deceptive acts or practices' to include 'such acts or
practices involving foreign commerce that cause or
are likely to cause reasonably foreseeable injury with
in the US or involve material conduct occurring with
in the United States'.
Australiais a signatory to a number of internation
al instruments which enshrine the protection of the
right to private life, including the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights40 . Yet, Aus
tralia does not have a Bill of Rights protecting fun

37

Vincent Mazeaud, Les Nouveaux Cahiers du Conseil constitution-

nel 3/2015 (N' 48) 5 et seqq. An explicit constitutionalisation of
privacy came through the caselaw of the Conseil Constitutionnel
from 1995.
38 Loi N'2016-1321 du 7 octobre 2016 pour une Republique
num6rique JORF n'0235 du 8 octobre 2016.
39 See, eg, Whalen v Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
40 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNTS
171.
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damental rights domestically and therefore also lacks
a constitutional right to privacy. The legal protection
of privacy and personal information in Australian
law remains piece-meal and incomplete. Informa
tion privacy is protected through statute law, in par
ticular the federal Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) and equiv
alents in the majority of Australian states and terri
tories. The Privacy Act 1988 adopts a principlesbased, rather than a prescriptive, approach to data
protection. It contains 13 Australian Privacy Princi

ples (APPs), which govern the collection, use, disclo
sure and storage of personal and sensitive informa
tion, and how individuals may access and correct
records containing such information. The APPs ap

ply to most Commonwealth government agencies
and large private sector organisations (the so-called
'APP entities').
There is no right to privacy in Australian common
law. To close this gap, the Australian Law Reform
Commission (ALRC) has repeatedly, but so far un
successfully, recommended the introduction of a
statutory cause of action to protect privacy.41 Under
current law, civil claims for breach of privacy are on
ly available if, and as far as, other civil causes of ac
tion2 coincidentally cover conduct that affects priva
cy.
CY42

The BrazilianConstitution acknowledges the invi
olability of private life and also the secrecy of tele
phonic, telegraphic and data communications. Fur
thermore, it provides for the writ of habeas data,
which gives citizens a means to access and correct
data about themselves held by third parties.
Despite the existence of a constitutional guaran
tee of privacy as well as other laws on the use of per
sonal data, a general law on data protection does not
exist. However, currently there are three legislative
initiatives in the National Congress which aim to reg
ulate, comprehensively, personal data protection:

dency of the Republic. Moreover, the Civil Code, the
Consumer Protection Code and, more recently, the
Civil Rights Framework of the Internet (or Internet
Act, Law no 12.965 of 2014) have regulated the pro
tection of personal data more specifically
Since the entering into force of the Internet Act,
Brazil disposes of an advanced legal framework
which establishes principles, rights and obligations
for the use of the Internet. A substantial portion of
the Act deals with privacy and data protection. Arti
cle 7 Internet Act provides rights and guarantees for
internet users. Among them, Article 7 subsections I,
II, III, VII and VIII guarantee the inviolability of pri
vacy and intimacy, the inviolability and secrecy of all
internet communication and private information
which can be lifted only on behalf of a judicial war
rant. Furthermore, they guarantee that personal da
ta will not be supplied to third parties, save upon free,
expressed and informed consent, as well as the right
to clear and complete information about the collec
tion, usage, storage, processing and protection of per
sonal data, which can only be used if the collection
is justified, not prohibited by law and if so specified
in the terms of service or in internet application con
tracts. Besides this, in Article 7 subsections X and
XIII, the Statute guarantees a right to erasure of per
sonal data provided by the internet user after the ter
mination of the legal relationship between parties
and foresees the application of consumer protection
rules to the consumer relations in the internet do
main.

2. The Absence of a Legal Definition of
Profiling

(House of Representatives); Draft Bill no 330/2013 of
the Senate, and Draft Bill no 5276/2016 of the Presi

While the aforementioned 2010 Council of Europe
Recommendation on Profiling defines profiling, this
instrument is not legally binding on Member States.
It defines profiling as an automatic data processing
technique that consists of applying a 'profile' to an
individual, particularly in order to take decisions con
cerning her or him or for analysing or predicting her
or his personal preferences, behaviours and atti

41

tudes.

Draft Bill no 4060/2012 of the Chamber of Deputies

Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information:
Australian Privacy Law and Practice (ALRC Report 108, 2008),

Recommendations 74-1 74-7; Australian Law Reform Commission, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era (ALRC Report

123, 2014).
42

ABC v Lenah Came Meats Pty Ltd [2001 ] HCA 63, (2001) 208
CLR 199.

43

Council of Europe (n 24) app 1(e).

43

In Germany, no legal definition of profiling has
been established to date. %6a(1) BDSG, transposing
Article 15 of the DPD concerning automated decision
making, mentions 'personal aspects' as a component
of a profile, but not the profile itself. %15(3)1 TMG
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uses the phrase 'usage profile', characterised in legal
commentary variously as 'a data record giving a part
image of a personality' 44 or, less strictly, 'any kind of
systematically compiled usage data containing infor
mation about the behaviour and habits of a user' 45 .
Legal scholarship has offered a variety of definitions
for profiling 46 without one having been established
as the leading one. Scoring for credit purposes, as a
special kind of profiling, is subject to a specific pro

vision,

%
28b

BDSG.

There is also no specific definition of profiling in
French law. Nevertheless, there is a legal framework
regarding profiling, defined by two laws. The first
one is Article lo of the 1978 Act which is a transpo
sition of Article 15 of the DPD adopted in 2004. The
second one is Article L. 5 81 9 Environmental Code
which requires prior approval by the Commissionna
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and to give consumers the ability to exercise more
control over data collection and use by corporate en
tities. In 2016, another federal agency, the Federal
Communications Commission, released new privacy
regulations that now require broadband companies
to seek subscriber permission to collect and use da
ta on web browsing, app use, and on geolocational
and financial information.
There is no statutory or otherwise official defini
tion, or specific regulation, of profiling in Australia
or Brazil,and no significant debate over it aside from

some scholarly discussions. Generally, profiling is un
derstood as profile creation, or as the act of automat
ed collection and processing of information about
users, with the intention of building presumptions
about their personalities and, therefore, predicting
future behaviour.

tionale de linformatique et des liberts (CNIL), the
French data protection regulator, of any system
which automatically measures the audience of adver
tising devices in a public space (such as billboards)
or analyses the typology or behaviour of individuals
passing by such devices. In addition, there is a rec
ommendation by the CNIL of 16 December 2013 re
garding the use of cookies.
Though the DPA 1998 and PECR provide the
framework in which profiling would be covered,
there is no official definition of profiling in the UK,
and there has not been a significant debate over it.
There are, however, specific provisions in the DPA
governing 'automated decision taking', not directly
covering the creation of profiling data, but potential
ly 4governing
the use of that data if used automatical
7

3. The Concept of Personal Data
Data protection laws only apply to the extent that
'personal data' are collected, processed or otherwise
handled. As mentioned in the introduction, profiling
consists of several steps, not all of which need to in
volve personal data. For example, when profiling in
cludes an assessment, recombination and evaluation
of anonymised or statistical data with no reference
to any individual, data protection laws do not apply
to these processes. Once personal data are collected,
processed or stored in order to create a profile of an
individual, data protection laws will become applic

ly.

In the US, data profiling is a term that appears to
be related to data analytics eg, a tool to provide met
rics and assess data quality, such as whether metada
ta is accurately descriptive. In the data privacy con
text of consumer protection, many discuss concerns
surrounding the work of data brokers which the FTC
has defined as 'companies that collect information,
including personal information about consumers,
from a wide variety of sources for the purpose of re
selling such information to their customers for vari
ous purposes, including verifying an individual's
identity, differentiating records, marketing products,
and preventing financial fraud'.
The FTC has recommended to Congress that it con
sider the enactment of legislation to increase the
transparency of consumer profiling by data brokers

44 Representing many others SilkeJandt and Philip Laue, 'Voraussetzungen und Grenzen der Profilbildung bei Location Based Services' [2006] K & R 316, 317.
45

Stephan Bauer, 'Personalisierte Werbung auf Social CommunityWebsites' [2008] MMR 435, 437; Kerstin Zscherpe in JOrgen
Taeger and Detlev Gabe (eds), BDSG und Datenschutzvorschriften
des TKG und TMG (2nd edn, R&W 2013) § 15 TMG, para 58.

46 Eg Peter Schaar, 'Persdnlichkeitsprofile im Internet' [2001] DuD
383, 385 et seq; Heike Rasmussen, 'Datenschutz im Internet'
[2002] CR 36, 38; Bruno Baeriswyl, 'Data Mining und Data
Warehousing: Kundendaten als Ware oder geschOtztes Gut?'
[2000] RDV 6, 7; Petra Wittig, 'Die datenschutzrechtliche Problematik der Anfertigung von Persdnlichkeitsprofilen zu Marketingzwecken' [2000] RDV 59; Philip Scholz in Spiros Simitis (ed),
Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (8th edn, Nomos 2014) § 6a, para 22;
Jandt and Laue (n 44) 316, 318.
47 Data Protection Act 1998 (UK) s 12; see also Information Commissioner's Office, Guide to data protection, Principle 6 rights
<https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/
principle-6-rights/automated-decision-taking/> accessed 11 November 2016.
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able. Despite the centrality of 'personal data' to the
application of data protection laws, the concept re
mains contentious, even within the EU.
The DPD of the EU defines personal data as 'any
information relating to an identified or identifiable
natural person; an identifiable person is one who can
be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by
reference to an identification number or to one or
more factors specific to his physical, physiological,
economic, cultural or social identity', Article 2(a). The
definition under the GDPR remains largely un
changed but contains some clarifications, because it
explicitly includes location data, online identifiers
and genetic identity as further potential identifiers.
Thus, under the definition in Article 4(i) GDPR, per

franqais et europ6en (Lextenso 2015) 248.

ing to racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, reli
gious or philosophical beliefs, trade union member
ship, health, sex life or sexual orientation.
In Germany, the BDSG defines personal data in
3(1) BDSG as any 'particulars concerning the person
al or material circumstances of an identified or iden
tifiable person'; the major contrast to the DPD/GDPR
being the reference to 'particulars'. Therefore, it is
sometimes doubted whether group and statistical in
formation attached to a single person can be consid
ered to be personal information. The definition of
special categories of personal data in %3(9) BDSG is
identical to the DPD. In regard to a subjective or ob
jective approach to determining identifiability, regu
lators and DPAs usually follow the objective ap
proach,4 9 so eg cookies are considered to generally
process personal data. 0 The discussion over it, lead
ing to the recent CJEU judgment on dynamic IP ad
dresses, should now end; special data is highly pro
tected. Non personal data is in general only protect
ed if copyright law is applicable or if the data is con
51
sidered to be a business secret.
In France, the 1978 Act originally only referred to
'nominative information', which was narrower than
the term 'personal data' later introduced by the DPD.
The current definition of 'personal data' in Article 2
of the 1978 Act is very similar to the wording of the
DPD and based on a comprehensive approach of iden
tifiability. Personal data means any information re
lating to a natural person who is or can be identified,
directly or indirectly The only difference is that Ar
ticle 2 provides that in order to determine whether a
person is identifiable, all the means that the data con
troller or any other person uses or may have access
to, should be taken into consideration. The DPD men
tions in recital 26 that only 'all the means likely rea
sonably to be used' by these should be taken in ac
count. The French definition of personal data is
broader than the one of the DPD because it includes
all the cases where a re identification of the person
is possible. Furthermore, this broad definition em
braces the nominative identity (names but also ge
netic and biometric features etc) and the virtual or
digital identity of the person such as any pseudonym,
avatar, logging code, cookies or IP addresses. 52 Final
ly, Article 8 includes a specific regime for sensitive
data.
In the UK, the definition of personal data is intend
53
ed to follow that in the DPD, but the case of Durant

Durant v Financial Services Authority [2003] EWCA Civ 1746.

narrowed the interpretation, suggesting that person

sonal data is 'any information relating to an identi

fied or identifiable natural person; an identifiable [...]
person is one who can be identified, directly or indi
rectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such
as a name, an identification number, location data,

an online identifier or to one or more factors specif
ic to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, eco
nomic, cultural or social identity'. The Court of jus
tice of the EU (CJEU) recently clarified that an objec
tive approach (meaning that it suffices for the con
struction of personal information if a person can be
identified by means available to anyone) should be
followed to determine identifiability. 48 Special cate
gories of personal data are subject to additional pro
tections under Article 9 GDPR, covering data relat

48 Case C-582/14 Breyer v Bundesrepublik Deutschland [CJEU,
2016] ECLI:EU:C:201 6:779 paras 39, 43, 46.
49 See Dasseldorfer Kreis, Ausgestaltung von Analyseverfahren zur
Reichweitenmessung bei Internet-Angeboten (decision from
26/27 November 2009); Thomas Dreier and Indra Spiecker
genannt Doehmann, Die systematische Aufnahme des Stralenbildes - zur rechtlichen Zulassigkeit von Online-Diensten wie

"Coogle Street View" (Nomos 2010) 67 et seqq; Matthias Bergt,
'Die Bestimmbarkeit als Grundproblem des Datenschutzrechts'
[2015] ZD 368.
50

Ulrich Dammann in Spiros Simitis (ed), Bundesdatenschutzgesetz
(8th edn, Nomos 2014) § 3, para 65; Peter Schaar, Datenschutz
im Internet (Beck 2002) paras 177 et seqq, 186; Johann Bizer,
'Web-Cookies datenschutzrechtlich' [1998] DuD 277, 280.

51

See BVerwG,case 6 B 59/04 [2005] in [2005] CR, 194, 195;
BVerfG, cases 1 BvR 2087/03, 1 BvR 2111/03 [2006] in [2006]
NVwZ 1041, 1042; BGH, case VI ZR 156/13 [2014] in [2014]
NJW 2014, 1235, 1237; also regulated explicitly in several
regulations.

52

Anne Debet, Jean Massot and Nathalie Metallinos, Informatique
et libertes, la protection a caractere donn6es personnelles en droit

53
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al data 'should have the putative data subject as its
focus' and referred to 'biographical significance',
meaning 'information that affects [a person's] priva
cy, whether in his personal or family life, business or
professional capacity'.
The courts in the UK have subsequently been
broadening the definition again, bringing it closer
54
to the definition in the DPD. In the case of Eden,
the Court of Appeal noted that the contentious re
quirement in Durant should only apply in 'border
line' cases. 55 The court specifically endorsed the
guidance of the UK Information Commissioner
(ICO) over what constitutes personal data, a guid
ance that aligns much closer with the wording of the
56
Directive.
As the UK considers its future approach to data
protection in the light of Brexit, it is possible that
the historical attitude to the definition of personal
data is retrenched. Whether cookies are considered
personal data is contextual: the ICO notes that
though the PECR apply to all cookies, the DPA ap
plies only to cookies that 'process personal data', im
plying that 'anonymised' cookie data do not consti
tute personal data,5 7 while whether IP addresses con
stitute personal data under UK law remains uncer
tain.
In the US, the concept of Personally identifiable
information (PlI) is defined as:
[A]ny information about an individual maintained
by an agency, including (1) any information that
can be used to distinguish or trace an individual's
identity, such as name, social security number,
date and place of birth, mother's maiden name, or
biometric records; and (2) any other information
that is linked or linkable to an individual, such as
medical, educational, financial, and employment
58
information.
In recent years, Congress has not passed federal leg
islation expressly defining the legal scope of 'person
al data' despite increased efforts for a more encom
passing definition. The Obama Administration pro
mulgated efforts to coordinate a data privacy legisla
tive reform in the 'Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights'.
In the White House 'Discussion Draft of the Con
sumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2015', for exam
ple, personal data is defined as any data that are un
der the control of a covered entity, not otherwise gen
erally available to the public through lawful means,
and are linked, or, as a practical matter, linkable by
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the covered entity, to a specific individual. Interest
ingly, sufficient is also the link to a device that is as
sociated with or routinely used by an individual. In
that sense, personal data can be, eg, (among others)
the name, address, telephone/social security/pass
port/driver's licence number, biometric identifier (eg
fingerprint) or any unique persistent identifier, in
cluding an alphanumeric string that uniquely iden
tifies a networked device, financial account number,
health care account number or any required securi
ty code, access code, or password that is necessary
to access an individual's service account. Also,
unique identifiers or other descriptive information
about personal computing or communication de
vices are included in the list. Moreover, any data that
are collected, created, processed, used, disclosed,
stored, or otherwise maintained and linkable, are
mentioned.
Australia uses the concept of 'personal informa
tion'. Since 2014, the Privacy Act 1988 defines 'per
sonal information' in section 6 as '[...] information or
opinion about an identified individual, or an individ
ual who is reasonably identifiable:
(a) whether the information or opinion is true or
not; and
(b) whether the information
or opinion is record
59
ed in material form or not'.
Unlike the Organisation for Economic Co opera
tion and Development (OECD) Guidelines, which de
fine personal data as 'information relating to an iden

54

Edem v IC & Financial Services Authority [2014] EWCA Civ 92.

55

'Roll out the bunting: Durant judgment is good as dead and
buried' (Amberhawk, 19 February 2014) <http://amberhawk
.typepad.com/amberhawk/2014/02/roll -out-the-bunting-durant
-judgment-is-good-as-dead-and-buried.html> accessed 11 November 2016.

56

Information Commissioner's Office, Guide to data protection, Key
definitions https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/key-definitions/ accessed 11 November 2016.

57

See Information Commissioner's Office, Guide to Privacy and
Electronic Communications Regulations <https://ico.org.uk/for
-organisations/guide-to-pecr/cookies-and-similar-technologies/>
accessed 11 November 2016.

58

US National Institute of Standards and Technology, US Department of Commerce, Guide to Protecting the Confidentiality of
Personally Identifiable Information (P11), Special Publication

800-122 (April 2010) <http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/
nistspecialpublication800-122.pdf> accessed 11 November 2016.
59

Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 6(1). 'Sensitive information' is given
greater protection under the APPs than other information. Sensitive information includes information about a person's racial or
ethnic origin; political opinions; religious or philosophical beliefs;
sexual orientation as well as health, genetic or biometric information.
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tified or identifiable individual',60 the Australian de
finition refers to information 'about' an individual.
It has been suggested that this may make a difference
in cases where information has only tenuous connec
tion with an individual, in particular where informa
tion identifies a device rather than an individual.61
This is illustrated by the ongoing so called Grubb
litigation, in which the Administrative Appeals Tri
bunal (AAT) held that the words 'about an individ
ual' in the definition of personal information raised
a threshold question that needs to be addressed be
fore the determination whether that individual is
identified or identifiable. AAT Deputy President
Forgie decided that mobile phone service metadata
was information about a service, not about an indi
vidua 62 notwithstanding the fact that the individ
ual who obtained the service was ascertainable from
this information. Similarly, it was held that a dynam
ic IP address is not information about an individual
because 'the connection between the person using a
63
mobile device and an IP address is ... ephemeral'.
The contentious decision that such metadata was not
personal information is currently under appeal. The
decision of Full Court of the Federal Court is highly
anticipated because it will provide the first interpre
tation by an appellate court of the Australian defin
ition of 'personal information'. The exact scope of
that term will be of critical importance in cases where
information can be linked to an individual only
through indirect means, such as the interrogation of,
and matching across, multiple databases. The Grubb
litigation has evident relevance also for tracking of
individuals through their use of electronic devices.
To the extent that cookie technology only ascertains
IP addresses rather than a person, it remains current
ly doubtful in Australia whether the information col
64
lected and stored is personal information.

60

OECD, Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder

Flows of Personal Data (2013) pt [1 b).
61

62

Eg Mark Burden and Alissa McKillop, 'The Google Street View
Wi-Fi Scandal and its Repercussions for Privacy Regulation'
(2013) 39 Monash University Law Review 702, 712.
Telstra Corporation Limited and Privacy Commissioner [2015]

AATA 991, 112.
63

ibid 113.

64

Robert Slattery and Marilyn Krawitz, 'Mark Zuckerberg, the
Cookie Monster Australian Privacy Law and Internet Cookies'
(2014) 16 Flinders Law Journal 1, 16.

65

Dasseldorfer Kreis, Ausgestaltung von Analyseverfahren zur
Reichweitenmessung bei Internet-Angeboten (decision from
26./27 November 2009).
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In Brazil,the concept of personal data is expressed
in the Draft Bills, and is defined as: any information
relating to an identified or identifiable individual, di
rectly or indirectly, including every address or iden
tification number of a terminal used for connection
to a computer network. The recent Decree no
8,771/2016, which regulates the Civil Rights Frame
work of the Internet, defines personal data, in item
I of Article 14, as data related to identified or identi
fiable natural persons, including identifying num
bers, electronic identifiers or locational data when
they are related to a person. Three types of data can
be the object of analysis: (1) General Personal Data
data related to an identified or identifiable natural
person, electronic identifiers or locational data, ie
birth dates, addresses, passwords, profile descrip
tions, etc; (2) Sensitive Data personal data reveal
ing racial or ethnic origin, religious, philosophical or
moral convictions; data concerning the health or sex
life, as well as genetic data; and (3) non personal da
ta data relating to a data subject that cannot be iden
tified, either by the controller or by any other per
son, taking into account the number of susceptible
means reasonably to be used to identify the data sub
ject.

4. Consent and Other Legitimate
Grounds for Profiling
According to European standards under the DPD, de
cision making based solely on automated processing
of personal data is in general forbidden, but it is law
ful when based on consent or another specified
ground. This will remain intact under the GDPR.
In Germany, the requirements of lawful data pro
cessing differ, depending on whether the profiling is
done by the data processor for his or her own commercial purposes (% 28 BDSG) or whether it is done
for the commercial purpose of transferring the re
sults to a third person (% 29 BDSG). Both provisions
require a balancing of interests. The DPAs agree that
advanced user profiles beyond the individual con
tract need to be pseudonymised.65 Under %28b BD SG,
businesses are allowed to generate and use a statisti
cal value on a person's future behaviour for the es
tablishment, execution or termination of a contrac
tual relationship. This scoring method may be used
on a mathematic statistical basis only, but not for
past related evaluation of data, hence prohibiting the
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generation of personal profiles, 66 which are conduct
ed by algorithm analysis.
By collecting and creating more data than neces
sary for the individual purpose, profiling often con
flicts with the principles of necessity and data scarci
ty and also with the principle of appropriation as pro
filing is executed to find new scopes for existing da
ta and create meta data. The balancing test therefore
regularly comes down in favour of the legitimate in
terest of the data subject. 67 This applies all the more
as the legitimate interest of a data subject of not be
ing profiled increases as more data about him or her
is compiled .68 The Cologne Civil Court of Appeals
ruled that a company did not have the right to estab
lish profiles comparing former customers under %28
BDSG.69
A comprehensive personal profile is seen as the
upper limit of what data collection and processing
are allowed to create. Uncontrolled compilation of
personal data, indexing the personality of a human
being and making him or her the pure object of in
formation, is inconsistent with the German constitu
tion 70 and also, considering the data retention deci
sion of the CJEU, 71 with European law.
As informed consent under %4a BDSG is bound
by its purpose, profiling can be based on consent on
ly if the purposes of the profiling are specified be
fore the processing. However, undefined profiling or
a general profiling for any not pre determined pur
pose is not permissible.
In the French legal context, there is no real prohi
bition of profiling but rather specific conditions for
allowing it. First, the collection of the data for a pro
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Spiros Simitis in Spiros Simitis (ed), Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (8th
edn, Nomos 2014) § 28, para 138 et seqq; Thomas Paefgen,
'Datenbankmanagement als Fahrungsinstrument' [1994] CR 65 et
seqq; Astrid Breinlinger, 'Datenschutzrechtliche Probleme bei
Kunden- und Verbraucherbefragungen' [1997] RDV 249 et
seqq; Thilo Weichert, 'Datenschutzrechtliche Probleme beim
Adresshandel' [1996] WRP 522, 527.
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785, 789 et seq.
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OLG Kdln, case 1-6 U 70/09 [2010] in [2010] NJW90.
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Digital Rights Ireland (n 27) and Karntener Landesregierung (n 27)
paras 27 et seqq, 32 et seqq, 52 et seqq.
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filing use must adhere to the main principles of the
1978 Act: fair and lawful processing (Article 6 %1) for
specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and only
for those purposes (Article 6 %2). The processing has
to be based on legitimate grounds (Article 7), consent
of the data subject being one of them. The pursuit of
the data controller's legitimate interest is also fre
quently invoked. Most of the time, a balancing of in
terest has to be done.
Secondly, specific requirements must be met for
the collection and the processing of special data. Ar
ticle 8 provides ten possibilities for profiling of sen
sitive data. Sensitive data may be profiled with the
explicit consent of the data subject or if the data sub
ject himself or herself disclosed these sensitive data,
except if a law prohibits it. 72 French law also impos
es an obligation to obtain authorisation by the CNIL
73
before the implementation of such processing.
In the UK, the legal limits are those governing da
ta in general. The UK government and the ICO gave
support to an internet based profiling and advertis
ing business that intercepted an ISP subscriber's web
traffic and built up a profile of the subscriber for com
mercial reasons claiming to apply an 'anonymisation'
technique. 74 In another case, the ICO found an app
that analysed people's tweets to assess whether they
were in a vulnerable mental state to be in breach of
the rules concerning sensitive personal data. The ICO
made it clear that data protection rules apply even
75
on public data from the public tweets.
In the US, notice and consent requirements are en
couraged bythe FTC's Fair Information Practice Prin
76
ciples (FIPPs):

data subject. However, a lot of profiling processing due to connected objects or smartphone applications should not be covered
by this exemption.
73

See art L. 581-9 of the Environmental Code requires prior approval by the CNIL of any system which automatically measures
of the audience on an advertising device in a public space (such
as billboards) or analyses the typology or behaviour of individuals
passing by such devices.
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See eg Paul Bernal, 'Rise and Phall: Lessons from the Phorm
Saga' in Serge Gutwirth et al (eds), Computers, Privacy and
Data Protection- An element of choice (Springer 2011).
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and Wrongs, 25 April 2015) <https://informationrightsandwrongs
.com/2015/04/25/ico-samaritans-radar-failed-to-comply-with-data
-protection-act/> accessed 11 November 2016.

76
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(une 1998) <https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
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December 2016.
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1. Notice/Awareness (to the individual about infor
mation collected, maintained and used by the entity);
2. Choice and Consent (on the part of the individ
ual about that information, including whether it is
collected in the first instance and how and under
what circumstances it is disclosed to third parties);
3. Access/Participation (whether the individual
has access to that information and the ability to cor
rect any mistakes);
4. Integrity/Security (the administrative, technical
and physical safeguards of the information, includ
ing notice if the information is leaked);
5. Enforcement/Redress (legal, policy, contractual
or ethical).
The FIPPs are understood to be conceptual guide
lines, not laws. 77 The adherence relies upon corpo
rate self regulation. In the US, no federal statute pro
vides consumers with the right to learn what infor
mation data brokers have compiled about them, nor
provides a requirement of consent or 'opt out' op
tions to prevent data brokers from collecting, shar
ing or publishing their personal information.
Profiling in Australia is subject to the general da
ta processing regime under the Privacy Act 1988
(Cth). As stated above, the APPs only apply to the
handling of personal information, so profiling on the
basis of de identified information is not regulated in
the Privacy Act.
Consent is a critical concept underlying a number
of the APPs. It can provide an exception from a gen
eral prohibition of handling data in a particular way.
For example, under APP 3-3, an APP entity can col
lect sensitive information about an individual only
with that person's consent. Under APP 6.1, an APP
entity must not use personal information for a sec
ondary purpose (ie a purpose other than the partic
ular purpose for which the data was collected) unless
the individual consents (or an exception applies).
Part IIIA of the Privacy Act 1988 sets out the types
of personal information that credit providers and
credit reporting bodies are permitted to collect about
an individual for the purpose of inclusion in that in
dividual's credit report. That part also provides safe
guards in relation to the handling of that informa
tion, including who is permitted to access an individ
ual's credit report and for what purposes.
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Robert Gellman, Fair Information Practices- A Brief History (rev.

June 17, 2016) <http://bobgellman.com/rg-docs/rg-FlPShistory.pdf
> accessed 15 December 2016.
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There is also a self regulatory guideline for third
party online behavioural advertising (OBA), devel
oped by the online advertising sector. The Guideline
states that no '[p]ersonal information is collected or
used for OBA' and distinguishes OBA from customer
profile advertising (which is based on the personal
information of an individual user). Also, third party
OBA is subject to seven self regulatory principles,
among them that third parties who want to combine
OBA data with personal information must treat the
OBA data as if it is personal information and in ac
cordance with the Privacy Act. Other principles in
clude a requirement to provide clear information to
users, to give users choice over the collection of data
for OBA, to keep data for no longer than necessary
and to seek explicit consent for sensitive market seg
ments.
In different situations, the Brazilian legal system
protects the individual by imposing a requirement
of prior consent for numerous acts of civil life. In the
digital context, the Civil Rights Framework to the In
ternet in item IX of Article 7 assigns rights to the da
ta subject, among these the clear manifestation of
consent for operations concerning his/her personal
data.
Law no 12.414/2011 (Credit Report Act) grants the
consumer power over the creation, transfer and can
cellation of his/her credit history. Consumer consent
is, hence, the touchstone of this framework, as pro
vided by Article 4. Furthermore, according to Article
5, consumers may obtain the cancellation of the
record upon request and, as determined by Article 9,
the sharing of information is permitted only if ex
pressly authorised by the consumer.

5. The Challenges of Transparency,
Remedies and Enforcement
Transparency, ie the obligation on data controllers to
be open and honest about their data handling prac
tices, is an important aim of data protection laws.
Under the DPD of the EU, the general rights of da
ta subjects also apply in the context of profiling. Thus,
the data subject may request information about
stored data, may require erasure or correction and,
if rights were violated, may in general claim dam
ages. The DPAs are entitled to control whether the
law was obeyed and may enact sanctions. In several
judgments, the CJEU has strengthened the position
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and independence of DPAs also vis avis the Euro
pean Commission. 78 Under the GDPR, the DPAs are
required to make use of a consistency procedure in
cross border cases; the fines for violations have been
raised, but other than that, the general structure of
remedies remains unchanged.
In Germany, the provider of Internet services is
subject to stricter data protection duties than a data
processor under general data protection law. Under
%13 (1)1 TMG, the data subject is to be notified about
the character, extent and purpose of the collection
and use of his or her personal data. 79 For automated
processing that enables the later identification of
users and prepares the collection of personal data, %
13 (1) 2 TMG also establishes a prior duty to inform
the data subject. 80 The declaration of consent and the
notification have to be executed separately from the
other information and declarations [%13 (2) TMG]
and can be done electronically. As illegal profiling in
fringes a person's right on informational self deter
mination, the data subject can apply for an injunc
tion 81 and also for damages, according to %823 (1 and
2) Civil Code (BGB) and %7 BDSG. However, as Ger
man law only exceptionally grants damages for non
pecuniary losses arising from injury of personality
rights, these monetary remedies are often fruitless.
In case of automated decision making, the data
subject may also claim information about the tech
nology behind the decision, ie the algorithms and the
data; however, the Bundesgerichtshof, the highest
German Civil Court, has restricted access in credit
scoring cases due to prevailing interests of the scor
82
ing company.
In France,the right to be informed (Article 32 of
the 1978 Act), the right to object (Article 38) and the
right to access and to rectification (Article 39) can be
used by the data subject in the context of profiling.
In the UK, advice and support is provided by the
ICO. Due to restraints in resources, in practice, data
subjects relyon civil society or pro active lawyers and
other groups to both discover that they have been il
legally profiled and to learn about potential remedies.
In the US, the FTC has released a report in May
2014 calling for greater transparency and account
ability measures in regulating data brokers. In the
corporate context, commercial databases are increas
ingly subjected to a regulatory framework that falls
within Section 5 enforcement of the FTC.
Consumers in the US generally have no federal
right to know what information data brokers have
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compiled about them. According to the FTC, no cur
rent federal laws require data brokers to maintain
consumer data privacy unless the data is used for
credit, employment, insurance, housing, or other re
lated purposes. Also, no federal law provides con
sumers with the right to correct inaccuracies in the
data. However, the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)
regulates consumer reporting agencies (CRAs),
which are entities that assemble consumer data into
consumer reports (credit reports) for credit scoring

systems. The FCRA applies to data brokers if the da
ta is used by issuers of credits or insurances, or by
employers, landlords, and others in making eligibil
ity decisions affecting consumers. Several experts
have recently called for greater regulation of data
mining, including regulation of government data
mining and regulation of private data brokers.
Enforcement of data privacy laws and promulga
tion of federal data privacy regulation can be accom
plished through agencies; many federal agencies
have created a Privacy Officer. On the private sector

side, consumers may file a complaint with the FTC,
for example. However, the jurisdiction is limited to
what congressional statutes may have been enacted
to support the agency's enforcement activities.
Under constitutional provisions, citizens can at
tempt to vindicate constitutional rights in federal
court. For example, in the No Fly List litigation, which
remains active, the plaintiffs have asserted both pro
cedural due process and substantive due process vi
olations. 83
In Australia,the declared object of APP 1is 'to en
sure that entities manage personal information in an
open and transparent way'. This includes that an APP
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entity has a clearly expressed and up to date privacy
policy about how it manages personal information
(APP 1.3). APP 5 requires that APP entities take rea
sonable steps to inform individuals of the fact and
circumstances, as well as the purposes, of the collec
tion of personal information and to which third par
ties the information will usually be disclosed. It de
pends on the circumstances of each case what steps
need to be taken to ensure compliance with this Prin
ciple. Under APP 12.1, an APP entity that holds per
sonal information must on request give the individ
ual access to the information. The legal remedies
against breaches of privacy are effectively limited to
regulatory responses. A person alleging a breach of
their privacy rights under the Privacy Act 1988 can
complain to the Office of the Australian Information
Commissioner. The Commissioner has traditionally
adopted a 'light touch' approach to regulation, under
which most complaints were resolved through con
ciliation. When the Commissioner makes use of his
power to make a determination, he may require the
respondent to change its practices or to take repara
tive action, including pay compensation, make an
apology or provide another suitable remedy As there
is no common law right to privacy, invasions of pri
vacy are not actionable in civil courts.
In Article 7, VIII, the BrazilianCivil Rights Frame
work of the Internet approaches transparency and
purpose. Article 7, VI and VIII establish that privacy
policies or any terms of use applicable to personal
data shall be clear and understandable. The need for
'clear and comprehensive' information is a conse
quence of the adoption of the informed consent
mechanism. All treatments of personal data shall be
known and transparent to the data subject, in their
existence and characteristics.
Like the Consumer Protection Code, the Credit Re
port Act establishes the rights to the access, rectifica
tion and cancellation of data (Article 5, 11 and III).
Furthermore, it grants the consumer access to the
main criteria used in the credit rating process, that
is, the consumer has the right to know the criteria
upon which a calculation of credit risk is based (Ar
ticle 5, IV).
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See also above 3.3.
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The original 1978 Act had opted for a larger material scope
including all administrative or private decision which implies an
appreciation on the human behaviour and not only a decision
having legal effect on individual.
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Data subjects who may wish to know about their
personal data stored at databases may require access
to this information. If denied the same, data subjects
have recourse to a constitutional writ of habeas da
ta, regulated by Federal Law no 9.507/97. Based on
Article 7, it shall be granted: to ensure knowledge of
information relating to the person of the petitioner
stored at public databases (I) or, for the correction of
data, when the petitioner does not prefer to do so
through confidential, judicial or administrative pro
ceedings (II).

6. Automated Decision-Making
The EU regulates automated decision making cur
rently through the DPD and, in future, through the
GDPR. However, the regulatory effects can be con
84
sidered as rather limited so far.
In Germany, %6a BDSG prohibits that decisions
with legal or other significant effect are based exclu
sively on an automated processing of personal data.
Aside from this, the use of profiling is only rarely for
bidden, eg in health or insurance law for reasons of
consumer protection; a general provision does not
exist.
In France,the ban of automated decision making
had been originally envisaged in the 1978 Act (Arti
cles 2 and 3).85 Currently, Article lo of the 1978 Act
provides that no decision having a legal effect on an
individual may be taken solely on the basis of auto
matic processing of data intended to define the pro
file of the data subject or to assess some aspects of
their personality. The Article has a theoretical scope.
It has only be quoted by the CNIL in order to remind
the data controller that he has to proceed to a human
intervention or to give the data subject the opportu
nity to give his/her point of view. The failure to com
ply with this obligation is not punishable by law. Un
der Article lo of the 1978 Act, the CNIL and the judges
can only provide a review of a decision that involved
a human intervention.
In the UK, there are specific provisions in the DPA
governing 'automated decision taking', not directly
covering the creation of profiling data, but potential
ly governing the use of that data if the data is
processed automatically. No further regulation exists
aside from the specific area of credit rating which is
regulated mostly by the Consumer Credit Act 1974,
which defines a 'credit reference agency' as 'a person
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carrying on a business comprising the furnishing of
persons with information relevant to the financial
standing of individuals, being information collected
by the agency for that purpose.' Credit reference
agencies (CRAs) are regulated by the Financial Con
duct Agency (FCA) rather than the ICO, and the cred
it reports they provide may also legally be used to
,...verify the identity, age and residency of individu
als, to identify and track fraud, to combat money
laundering and to help recover payment of debts.'86
The FCA requires CRAs to supply credit rating in
formation to individuals in a timely manner and at
a low cost, but not the logic or underlying systems
through which ratings are calculated.
In the US, there are no specific rules or regulations
that govern automated decision making processes as
a whole. Companies may use them in a range of busi
ness environments, including in credit and mortgage
lending and employment decisions. To the extent
that guidance is provided on automated decision
making, it would likely be applied pursuant to an al
ready existing regulatory regime. For instance, the
Fair Credit Report Act of 197o regulates the collec
tion, dissemination and use of consumer informa
tion, including consumer credit information, and
fairness and accuracy in credit decision making. In
regard to data processing between the EU and the
US, the Article 29 Working Party has commented that
the new US EU Privacy Shield does not provide any
guarantees in relation to control of automated deci
87
sion making.
In Australia,profiling abuses can arise when deci
sions are made on the basis of unjustifiable profil
ing, including decisions made on an automatic ba
sis. 88 There is currently no specific regulation in Aus
tralia of automated or computer assisted decision
making although it is becoming increasingly wide
spread. 89 Anti discrimination legislation may pro
vide redress in cases in which decisions are based on
non permissible grounds such as race, sex or disabil
ity.
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In Germany, the Bundesgerichtshof refused to
grant a data subject access under %34 BDSG to the
calculation method of a credit scoring agency The
so called 'score formula' was judged to be part of a
company's protected business secrets; access rights
were limited to information about the data used and
the conclusion. 91 The decision has been criticised
as
92
reducing the rights of data subjects too far.
The Bundesverfassungsgericht,the German Con
stitutional Court, has ruled several times that over
reaching profiles by the state are not legitimate un
der the Constitution,93 however, data retention is pos
sible. 94 This ruling also applies indirectly to profil
ing by private entities.
In France, case law on profiling, as well as data
protection in general, is remarkably scarce. The ma
jority of decisions relate to the informed consent of
the data subject regarding cookies, usually following
CNIL investigations into the use of cookies in certain
sectors (dating web sites or news websites) or by com
panies (Google, Facebook). 95 In some cases, the stor
ing of the data was excessive in time. 96 Furthermore,
globalised information service companies such as
97
Google and Facebook were criticised by the CNIL
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7. The Scarcity of Case Law on Profiling

94 BVerfG cases 1 BvR 256/08 and others [2010] in BVerfGE 125,
260, 321.

There is no EU case law on profiling. The data reten
tion decision of the CJEU, which concerned the col
lection and use of telecommunications data, 90 has
some bearing on profiling because it defined narrow
limits for general and blanket data retention.

95

Decision 2016-007 of 26 January2016 in which the CNIL
revealed that the large scope of the surveillance made by Facebook.

96 See the Deliberation 2013-420 of the CNIL regarding Google
Privacy Policy.
97 ibid.
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for compiling all the information across all of their
services or across Internet users without legal basis.
In its deliberation 2015 255, the CNIL disallowed
the practice of estimating pedestrian flow in a
Parisian district by using information from tracking
the addresses of mobile phones within the reach of
25 metres. The decision was based on Article 7 of the
1978 Act and the lack of informed consent. The CNIL
estimated that the data controller's legitimate inter
est has to be compatible with the right to be previ
ously informed of the data subject. The CNIL also
pointed to the lack of proportionality between the
risks of the processing and the guarantees created for
the data subject.
In the UK, due to the general 'light touch' approach
of the ICO, many of the key examples in this field
never reach court and ICO's opinions sometimes
come to public attention only as a result of Freedom
98
of Information requests.
One profiling case that did come to court has been
the 'blacklisting' system that had been used by ma
jor construction firms for many years. 99 Secretly es
tablished profiles of workers on union activity, health
and safety issues etc. were used to 'blacklist' and pre
vent them from being employed.100 The case was fi
nally settled out of court for tens of millions of pounds
of damages from the blacklisters;10 1 the basis, how
ever, was breach of confidence and defamation rather
than any specific profiling or data protection law.
Other critical cases include Vidal Hall 02 concern
ing Google's tracking of people for targeted advertis
ing overriding the privacy settings in the browser. Ef

98

Eg the Samaritans Radar app, see UK section (n 75) 18.

99

For a detailed discussion of this story, see Dave Smith and Phil
Chamberlain, Blacklisted- the Secret War Between Big Business

fectively, the court ruled that for the tort of 'misuse
of private information' 10 3 to apply, and for a breach
of the Data Protection Act in addition to that, there
was no need for pecuniary harm. In other words, the
distress alone of having one's private information
gathered against one's wishes was a breach which
leaves the possibility for profiling itself to be seen as
a breach.
With regard to credit scores, the Brazilian Superi
or Court of Justice (ST) 10 4 has recently decided that
this commercial practice is authorised by Article 5,
IV and by Article 7, 1 of the Credit Report Act. There
fore, credit score data banks are a lawful commercial
practice. But, data subjects must authorise the inclu
sion of their information in the database (Article 2,
II), thus making a further consent by the consumer
to make use of it unnecessary. However, if consumers
request information about the sources of data used,
these shall be provided (Article 2). The violation of
these rights may give rise to liability of the service
provider, the person responsible for the database, the
source and the person or company that made use of
the information (Article 16) for the occurrence of
moral damages in the event of use of excessive infor
mation or sensitive data (Article 3, %3, 1 and II), and
in cases of improper denial of credit using incorrect
10 5
or outdated data.
Especially interesting for profiling studies is the
Oi/Phorm case, investigated and decided by the Na
tional Consumer Bureau (SENACON) of the Ministry
of Justice. The SENACON issued a fine of $1.6 mil
lion to one of the country's largest telecommunica
tions companies (Oi) for invading the privacy of sub
scribers to its broadband Internet service by tracking
their web usage and offering this data for behaviour
10 6
al advertisement without consent.

and Union Activists (New Internationalist 2015).
100 Information Commissioner's Office, For the public: Construction
blacklist <https://ico.org.uk/for-the-public/construction-blacklist/>
accessed 11 November 2016.
101 See 'Construction workers win payouts for "blacklisting"' (BBC
News, 9 May 2016) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-36242312 and 'Vidal-Hall v Google Inc' (5RB, 16 January
2014) <http://www.5rb.com/case/vidal-hall-ors-v-google-inc/>
accessed 11 November 2016.
102 Vidal-Hall v Google Inc [2014] EWHC 13 (QB).
103 As established in Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22.
104 The STJis responsible for the final judgment of civil and criminal
cases not involving constitutional matters thus standardizing the
interpretation of federal law.
105 STJ-Resp. 1419697 RS, Rel. Ministro Paulo de Tarso Sanseverino,
Segunda Se ao, julgado em 12/11/2014, DJ17/11/2014 <http://
zip.net/bxtxbk> accessed 11 November 2016.
106 Phorm is the same company referred to in the UK section (n 74).

V. Conclusion and Outlook
Profiling is a worldwide practice of analysing infor
mation and making use of personal data to evaluate
aspects of individual personality and to predict hu
man behaviour. Big and Smart Data analytics make
this practice potentially more accessible, more reli
able, and therefore economically more lucrative.
There is a dearth of decided cases, making it diffi
cult to assess whether the differences in regulatory
approaches have much effect on the actual practice.
Consumer protection rights, telecommunications
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law, data protection frameworks and general priva
cy rights, to name just a few, all compete with each
other without setting clear standards or providing
clear outcomes. Legal scholarship is only beginning
to address the conflict of interests arising from the
use and economic benefits of commercial profiling,
on the one hand, and its effect on personal dignity,
autonomy and privacy, on the other hand.
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While the use and applications of commercial pro
filing are likely to increase, many questions remain
to be answered. In the age of Big and Smart Data, of
ubiquitous computing and self learning machines, a
clearer approach to the regulation of profiling that
gives proper consideration to both its promises and
risks, is urgently required. This report provided a first
overview and comparative stock take.

